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Introduction
Anyone even slightly familiar with the Dutch situation can hardly fail to notice 
the degree to which the Dutch political discourse has channeled the attention of 
its indigenous inhabitants around concepts of nation, national language, and 
national loyalty since the beginning of the 21st century. Considering the most 
recent developments that have taken place in Dutch political discourse, one can 
hardly miss either how the concept of nation is being presented to the people as 
a homogeneous entity, with one language serving the role of (official) national 
language and one of its varieties—the standard one—generally being presented 
as neutral vis-à-vis all the others. As a result of such a policy, the (official) national 
language becomes a powerful tool of group belonging and its mastery comes to 
be considered pivotal to maintaining national order (Bauman & Briggs, 2003). 
Consequently, a fundamental difference between the people who fall within 
the nation, language, and territory equation and those falling outside it is that the 
former are legally recognized members of an “imagined community” of people 
(Anderson, 1991). These people—whether they know each other or not—all share 
a common identity, namely that of being fellow nationals through a wide range 
of semiotic resources, such as a national flag, a national anthem, a liberation day, 
a national football team. When engaged in questions of migration and citizenship, 
indigenous inhabitants base themselves on ideologies of language and belonging. 
These ideologies are generally shared attitudes and beliefs that work as the binding 
cement of the nation. They pave the way for a connection between citizenship and 
mastery of the majority language as a prerequisite for positive social participation 
and crucial for maintaining national order. Ideologies are propagated through 
discourses, which in turn are authored and authorized by “real” macro-historical 
actors, such as governments, ministries, and political parties, their electoral 
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programs and their representatives. It is because of their historical rootedness that 
ideologies are not very likely to cause cognitive dissonance, being sold as they 
often are as “commonsensical” thinking or, to borrow a term from Bourdieu 
(1991), as doxas. The ideology inherent in testing would-be immigrants’ profi-
ciency in the national language is one that presents the acquisition of the national 
language and the acquisition of the mainstream cultural norms and values for 
immigrants (newly arrived ones as well as legally recognized long term residents) 
as commonsensical, testing being an objective way of providing tangible proof of 
the immigrant’s progress on a continuum that goes from “being a foreigner” to 
“being an integrated citizen.” As a result of this, test results carry a heavy indexi-
cal load. This is so not only in terms of categories of inclusion and exclusion (i.e., 
who takes the test versus who does not), but also in terms of the values attached 
to such categories and their contribution, or lack thereof, to mainstream society 
(McNamara & Shohamy, 2008; Spotti, 2011a).
Another important element to be taken up here is what exactly the testing 
industry understands by language and culture. Often, if not always, this comes 
down to a modernist conceptualization whereby language and culture are looked 
upon as a whole gamut of skills that someone has at their disposal precisely 
because he or she was born, raised, and schooled in a specific nation. Naturally, 
immigrants who enter a nation, and in the case of the Netherlands also those 
immigrants who already are legally recognized long term residents, need to be 
put in a position where they can acquire these skills. “Correct” mastery of these 
skills carries positive consequences. Thus, for instance, immigrants who have 
managed to master cultural norms and values and are willing and able to put 
them into practice—an example might be an imam who shakes hands with a 
female minister of integration—are looked upon as being a “good” citizen, adher-
ing as they are to the cultural practices of the receiving society. Similarly, immi-
grants who have learned to speak the majority language well are often praised by 
native inhabitants for being good language users through (informal) compliments 
like: “Well, you speak good Dutch for a foreigner.” The people in question, in fact, 
have managed to learn the official national language, most likely in one of its 
regional varieties, with a certain degree of appropriateness and thus are worthy 
of praise because it shows a form of civic integration into the mainstream, which 
in turn constitutes a contribution to the maintenance of national order. The testing 
industry takes this modernist understanding of language and culture a step 
further by adding a subtle yet remarkable twist. In seeing language and culture 
as stable denotational entities, the testing industry embraces an understanding of 
language and culture as skills that can be marketed, that can be bought and sold, 
and most important of all that can be measured. The upshot of it is that in the 
case of poor results, if someone fails the test and hence lacks—or at least fails to 
demonstrate—the ability to positively integrate into mainstream society, economic 
and residential sanctions become justifiable measures.
It is against this background that the present chapter sets out to illustrate the 
ideologies inherent in the testing for (a) admission and (b) integration of immi-
grants in the Netherlands. Rather than exploring these through the direct experi-
ence of the immigrant (Block, 2006), it takes the perspective of the nation-state’s 
testing machinery and focuses on a period that can roughly be indicated as 
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between March 2006 and January 2007 given that this period is key to a series of 
shifts within the political discourse surrounding civic integration of immigrants 
and the language-testing industry.
The texts referred to in this chapter are small samples taken from a large col-
lection of official publications including policy documents, government reports, 
declarations issued by ancillary agencies—both governmental and private—asked 
to advise the government, as well as press conference declarations, released par-
liamentary interventions, and public interviews. It is on the basis of these docu-
ments that the chapter offers an insight into the testing regime for integration and 
its discourse, the implications for immigrants coming to and residing in the Neth-
erlands and how this regime mirrors the polarization that has taken place in Dutch 
society.
Conceptualization
The current Dutch political discourse on immigrant minorities abounds with 
terms used to describe the identities of immigrant minority group members. As 
the first of many we encounter the term allochtoon. The concept, officially intro-
duced in 1989 by the Scientific Council for Government Policies (WRR, 1989), was 
originally used to refer to a person born abroad or having at least one parent born 
abroad. The intention of the WRR in introducing the term allochtoon was to 
abandon a group-oriented approach to immigrant minority groups and to focus 
on individuals. Over the years, however, this term has acquired all kinds of nega-
tive connotations, becoming associated primarily with the absence of and need 
for linguistic integration and the lack of positive social participation in main-
stream society. More recently, a further hierarchization has been added to the 
Dutch minority jargon with the introduction of the terms westerse allochtonen 
(Western immigrant minorities) and niet-westerse allochtonen (non-Western immi-
grant minorities). The former refers to EU citizens as well as those immigrants 
coming from English-speaking countries mostly, although it includes also Indo-
nesians and Japanese. In the political discourse, members of this category are 
scarcely mentioned as constituting a threat to social cohesion, although Poles, 
Bulgarians, and Romanians are often singled out as posing a potential threat to 
the native manual labor workforce. The latter term, by contrast, includes mostly 
members of the Turkish, Moroccan, and Somali communities as well as new arriv-
als from other countries (Van den Tillart et al., 2000), who are presented as people 
in need of societal and linguistic integration. All of the above are identity ascrip-
tion terms currently used in political and public discourse by native Dutch people 
to contrast with self-reference terms such as autochtonen (indigenous group 
members) and Nederlanders (Dutch people).
The array of terms used to refer to minorities pales into insignificance when 
compared with the armor of terms developed by the Dutch testing industry, par-
ticularly in recent years. First, there is the term toelatingstest (admission test), 
which is a test that takes place in the immigrant’s own country of origin and which 
serves the purpose of making him or her eligible for admission to the Netherlands. 
Second, we have the term inburgering (civic integration) (De Heer, 2004). This term, 
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which first appeared in the Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers (Law on the Integra-
tion of Newcomers) (WIN, 1998), deals with the need for societal and linguistic 
integration of nieuwkomers (newcomers), that is newly arrived immigrants on 
Dutch soil who are not qualified as refugees or asylum seekers. This need for 
integration also applies to oudkomers (oldcomers), generally low-educated immi-
grants who are long term residents in the Netherlands and who, in the vast major-
ity of cases, already hold a residence permit.
In the following section, the reader is presented with a brief history of the laws 
and regulations for integration in the Netherlands. First, however, as frequent 
reference will be made to the measuring of language proficiency in Dutch follow-
ing the terms spelled out by the Common European Framework of Reference 
(CEFR), it is necessary to briefly discuss the structure of the CEFR (Council of 
Europe, 2001), its original purpose, as well as the use that the Dutch government 
has made of this instrument within the framework of testing for integration (refer 
to Extra, Spotti, & Van Avermaet, 2009, for a comprehensive discussion of the use 
of the CEFR across Europe).
The Common European Framework of Reference
In many nation-states across Europe, one of the key features of the integration 
policy is the official national language. For the Netherlands, knowledge of the 
Dutch language is key to admission and integration and is a prerequisite for 
the applicant to be awarded a permanent residence permit or be granted na -
turalization. In order to flesh out and to implement this policy of linguistic 
homogenization, the CEFR was used to mark the level of language knowledge 
and proficiency to be attained by prospective immigrants. The CEFR, which has 
come to be a structural pillar of the (Dutch) regime of language testing for integra-
tion, defines levels of language knowledge and proficiency that allow us to 
measure the progress made by immigrants in the course of their integration track. 
The main objective of the CEFR is to offer a frame of reference, a metalanguage, 
as it were. It serves to promote and facilitate cooperation among educational 
institutions in different countries. It aims to provide a transnational basis for the 
mutual recognition of language qualifications. A further aim is to assist learners, 
teachers, course designers, examining bodies, and educational administrators to 
coordinate their efforts. And a final aim is to create transparency in helping part-
ners in language teaching and learning to describe the levels of proficiency 
required by existing standards and examinations in order to facilitate comparisons 
between different qualification systems. It is important to emphasize that the 
CEFR was never intended to serve as a prescriptive model or a fixed set or book 
of language aims. Rather, it has a quantitative and a qualitative dimension. The 
former dimension covers learning development in domains (school, home, work), 
functions (ask, command, inquire), notions (south, table, father), situations 
(meeting, telephone), locations (school, market), topics (study, holidays, work), 
and roles (listener in audience, participant in a discussion). The qualitative dimen-
sion expresses the degree of effectiveness (precision) and efficiency (leading to 
communication) of language learning. A set of six levels and sublevels (A1, A2, 
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B1, B2, C1, C2) has been distinguished for use as common standards that should 
help course providers to relate their products such as coursebooks, teaching 
courses, and assessment instruments to a common reference system.
As mentioned before, the cornerstone of integration policies in most European 
countries is the official national language. For the Netherlands, knowledge is the 
main condition for those who want to apply for admission, be granted residence, 
and be awarded citizenship. To realize this monolingual policy, test makers in the 
Netherlands use the CEFR as a marker of the level immigrants ought to attain. 
This is problematic when the CEFR is used for admission, integration, and citizen-
ship tests where a large part of the target group either has low literacy skills or is 
functionally illiterate. When we look at the CEFR from the L2 user’s perspective, 
however, there is a severe lack of evidence that shows that all L2 learners of a 
given language at a given level (other than the lowest level A1) are able to perform 
all tasks associated with lower level descriptors. For the Netherlands, knowledge 
of both the Dutch language and Dutch society are the most important precondi-
tions for those who aspire to being admitted to the Netherlands in the first place 
and for those who wish to qualify for a residence permit and later on for citizen-
ship. In fleshing out this monolingual approach to language policy, the agencies 
involved in the making of the admission, integration, and citizenship tests—
although, as we will see, the latter was incorporated in the integration test after 
June 2006—have used the CEFR as a reference point. The use of the CEFR thus 
turns out to be quite problematic for two reasons. First, the CEFR is used for the 
admission and integration examination even when a vast majority of the people 
being asked to take these tests have low literacy levels or are illiterate (Kurvers & 
Stockmann, 2009). Second, the level descriptors of the CEFR are mainly aimed at 
measuring the language knowledge of highly educated people. Lower- and semi-
skilled people who have no background in higher education or do not study at a 
higher level do not fall within the categories described in the CEFR, as a result of 
which, backed up by the national authorities, recourse is being taken to introduce 
new CEFR levels (e.g., A1–) for use in the admission test. The role played by the 
CEFR in the Dutch testing machinery becomes even more problematic when one 
looks at the consequences involved in not coming up to the minimum level 
required. If they fail to attain the level required, people are refused citizenship, 
residence, or even admission. Summarizing, it is important to emphasize that 
the proficiency levels employed as a measure for testing immigrants were never 
intended to be used for that purpose.
The Moralization of Citizenship Through the Use of 
Language Testing
The legislative pillars of the Dutch testing regime for newly arrived migrants have 
been built on since 1998. Before 1998, there was but one government document 
(RRIN, 1996) that pointed to the obligation of newcomers to learn Dutch. The law 
that was approved in 1998 prescribed that newcomers—from the moment of their 
arrival in the Netherlands—were obliged to attend courses of Dutch as a second 
language and understanding Dutch society with a particular focus on work 
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situations. They were also advised to take part in the final examinations of these 
courses, so that they could show the certificate as proof that they had actually 
taken these courses. Although these courses were in place, there was no specifica-
tion of the level of language proficiency to be achieved, as the law proposed only 
one level newcomers should strive to attain—more specifically level 3, which is 
comparable to level B1 of the CEFR. This situation changed dramatically in 2003 
with the General Government Accord (Hoofdlijnenakkoord, 2003) and even more 
in 2004 with the introduction of the government resolution on the Revision of 
Civic Integration Regulations (Verdonk, 2004a). In comparison with the law 
approved in 1998, there are a series of fundamental changes that show the Dutch 
government’s new approach toward integration of newly arrived migrants. These 
changes are:
•	 the	use	of	an	admission	test	that	has	to	be	taken	(and	passed)	before	newcom-
ers are allowed to enter the Netherlands;
•	 both	newcomers	and	oldcomers	are	obliged	by	law	to	undergo	civic	integra-
tion in Dutch society;
•	 the	obligation	to	undergo	civic	integration	lies	with	the	migrants	themselves,	
both financially and in terms of content. This also implies that they are free 
to select the package that will help them fulfill their civic integration 
obligations;
•	 the	obligation	to	undergo	civic	integration	is	fulfilled	only	when	all	the	com-
ponents of the examination on this issue have been passed.
In the revised version of the Civic Integration Regulations of 2004, newcomers to 
the Netherlands emerge as constituting the main cause for concern. What is new 
in the 2004 document is the attention paid to the integration of oldcomers who 
had not sufficiently mastered the Dutch language and who were receiving unem-
ployment benefits (see Pluymen, 2004, for a critique of the link made in these 
regulations between permanent residence status and social benefits). Oldcomers 
who had already been given a permanent residence permit or a Dutch passport 
were also invited—though not compelled—to participate in the integration track. 
To this group, consisting of some 85,000 “allochtonous” citizens (as they are 
referred to in the document), the following applied: They were to register for 
compulsory intake at the immigration office of the municipality of residence; they 
were to undergo a civic integration track to be financed by themselves; they were 
given a free choice from among existing civic integration programs and providers 
that were approved by the government, newcomers being given three and a half 
years to become integrated, oldcomers being granted five years. These changes 
eventually led to the introduction of the admission test, which is to be taken 
abroad, and to a revision of the civic integration exam, which has to be taken once 
one has arrived in the Netherlands. To establish the norms to be adhered to for 
these two exams, a committee was appointed in 2004 to advise the government 
on this issue. The committee, commonly known as the Commissie Franssen (the 
Franssen Committee), named after its chairman, gave its first advisory opinion in 
2004. On the basis of criteria such as functionality, feasibility, selection of previous 
educational tracks, and motivation, the committee came to the conclusion that 
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proficiency in written Dutch language skills should not be examined while profi-
ciency for oral skills should be fixed below the lowest level of the CEFR. This level 
was subsequently classified as A1– (see Adviescommissie Inburgeringsnormen, 
2004). The committee also advised the government not to test knowledge of Dutch 
society because of a low level of knowledge of the Dutch language and to instead 
run a compulsory course providing an “introduction to life in the Netherlands.” 
This final recommendation was not taken on by the government, and the admis-
sion test includes a component on knowledge of Dutch society (IND, 2005).
The Law on Integration Abroad (Wet Inburgering Buitenland) was introduced 
in March 2006 (WIB, 2006). Immigrants who want to enter the Netherlands of their 
own free will are to undergo an exam on spoken Dutch and an exam on knowl-
edge of Dutch society before they are allowed into the country. With January 1, 
2007 as the projected date of enforcement, then Minister of Integration Rita 
Verdonk proposed the last few changes to the Law on Civic Integration in June 
2006 (Wet Inburgering Nederland). These changes, however, met with severe 
opposition from a majority in parliament, who rejected any unequal treatment of 
“native” and “naturalized” Dutch nationals. Verdonk’s appeal to parliament for 
“political courage” did not succeed, not even with her own party members in 
parliament, and led to a halving of the original target group numbers. Apart from 
these changes being rejected, many other amendments to the proposed law were 
passed, making it even more detailed and complex, and thus even more difficult 
to carry out in practice. In order to cope with the difficulties encountered, Verdonk 
in accordance with the wishes of a majority in parliament, decided to only par-
tially introduce the new law in 2007, limiting it to newcomers without Dutch citi-
zenship. In June 2006, the Dutch cabinet fell after its refusal to approve a general 
pardon for those asylum seekers without legal residence status who had entered 
the Netherlands before April 2001, in spite of the fact that a narrow majority in 
parliament was in favor of it. The center-left government that succeeded the 
cabinet in November 2006 approved this pardon as one of its first measures. On 
November 13, 2007, Ella Vogelaar—then minister of integration, housing, and 
communities—released a press statement that can be taken as tangible proof of a 
discourse shift to a more egalitarian climate within Dutch political discourse. Her 
declaration reads as follows:
The cabinet wants to put a stop to the increasing polarization in the Netherlands. . . . 
Integration can only succeed if both non-native and native citizens accept Dutch 
society as their society. They need to support the liberties, rights, and duties con-
nected to the Dutch civic state. . . . The cabinet appeals to all citizens to participate 
actively in society on the basis of mutual acceptance and equality. (Vogelaar, 2007, 
author’s own translation)
Although it would appear to announce a change in the tone of the integration 
debate, the measures adopted in 2003 and 2004 for civic integration remained in 
force, resulting in a harsh testing regime. Applicants who do not manage to pass 
the admission exam are not allowed to enter the Netherlands. Those who did not 
pass the civic integration exam in the Netherlands did not get a permanent resi-
dence permit (in the case of newcomers) or could not apply for citizenship (in the 
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case of oldcomers). After 2007, other complementary measures followed, particu-
larly measures dealing with the actual implementation and the costs of the civic 
integration track, and there was a shift from the costs being partly subsidized 
through loans from the municipality to the costs being solely the responsibility of 
the immigrants. In the most recent government resolution, we read:
It can be expected from anyone coming to reside in the Netherlands that he or she 
abide by the rules that obtain here and that he or she actively participate in society 
by mastering the Dutch language, attending education, and taking part in the work-
force. Qualifications are the key to successful participation and integration. (Gedoog-
akkord, September 30, 2010, author’s own translation)
The official agreement closed between the current Dutch minority government 
and the party pledging its support to this government to create a majority 
in parliament (provided the agreement is adhered to) stipulates the following 
measures:
Immigrants and asylum seekers are solely responsible for their own integration in 
our country. To those who lack the financial means to pay for these purposes, the 
cabinet offers the possibility of loaning money, which implies that the money loaned 
will have to be paid back. Ultimately, the resolution adopted by the cabinet implies 
that, barring exceptional circumstances, failure to pass the integration exam will 
result in withdrawal of the temporary residence permit. The cabinet further proposes 
to accept the bilateral agreement between the EU and Turkey, making the due changes 
to the regulation that inhabitants of Turkey fall within integration regulations. 
(Gedoogakkord, September 30, 2010, author’s own translation)
The coalition agreement entitled “Vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid” (“Freedom 
and Responsibility”) stresses once more that immigrants who want to reside in 
the Netherlands have to follow the rules spelled out for civic integration and 
participate actively in the fields of education and work. In relation to the civic 
integration exams, the agreement states that: “The examination requirements are 
made stricter . . . there is the projected use of a test which makes it possible 
to determine whether loyalty to the Netherlands is deeper than loyalty to any 
other country” (Regeerakkoord, 2010, p. 23, author’s own translation).
Since April 2011, the changes made to the Law on Integration Abroad have been 
put into practice. Since this date, the norms for the oral exam abroad have 
been raised from A1– to A1 and immigrants have to take a test in literacy and 
reading comprehension, scoring at least level A1–. On June 17, 2011 the cabinet 
approved another series of amendments, including the following: civic integration 
applicants pay for their own costs with the possibility of taking out a loan for 
those with insufficient financial means, and the examination must be passed 
within three years. The language proficiency level to be attained remains at CEFR 
level A2 minimum for newcomers. Also, the level for knowledge of Dutch society 
remains unchanged even though the exam now consists of a central part and an 
ancillary part. In the meantime, the level proposed for naturalization is CEFR level 
B1 (the level equivalent to that required for the State Examination Dutch, Program 
1). The Netherlands has been the first country to introduce an examination for 
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Dutch language to be taken in the applicants’ country of origin and the first to 
grant someone entry into the country on the basis of a computerized test admin-
istered over the telephone. The admission test puts applicants under considerable 
financial strain, if only because in most places there is no Dutch embassy nearby 
where the test can be taken, and in addition working with a DVD and a computer 
requires a certain level of technical skill. But above all, the exam on knowledge of 
Dutch society—which really is a language test cloaked as a civic knowledge test—
requires potential migrants to make the norms and values of mainstream Dutch 
society their own. Clearly, these tests do not improve and reduce the time required 
for applicants’ integration, but instead underscore the huge possible gaps between 
applicants in terms of literacy, language skills, computer skills, and socioeconomic 
background. Effectively, this means that doors remain open only for those 
applicants who fall within the category of literate, financially self-supporting, 
technically skilled people who can prepare for the exam and who have a high 
employability rate once they have entered the Netherlands. The exam on civic 
integration in foreign countries thus imposes an implicit hierarchization on 
the immigrant population in terms of who is considered suitable for entering the 
Netherlands. Table 23.1 presents a schematic overview of the historical develop-
ments that have taken place in the civic integration regulations from 1998 to 2011.
What is worth pointing out is that as of April 1, 2011 a new assessment compo-
nent has been included in the civic integration exam, which is the literacy and 
reading comprehension exam. In order to pass this part of the integration exam, 
the examinee has to be able to read in Dutch (in the Latin alphabet) at CEFR level 
A1. This exam consists of five different tasks: (a) reading words out loud, (b) 
reading sentences out loud, (c) reading parts of texts out loud, (d) completing 
incomplete sentences, and (e) answering questions related to a short text. The 
answers to the other two parts of the examination are to be spoken into a telephone 
receiver. These answers are subsequently analyzed by a speech recognition 
program that assigns a score to each answer. The whole civic integration exam 
costs €350. Applicants can take the test as many times as they wish within the 
time allotted for reaching a pass level in all of the components. Each time they 
take the test, however, they will have to pay €350. Only when applicants have 
passed all three parts of the integration exam will they be given permission to 
apply for a visa to enter the Netherlands and, with that, a temporary residence 
permit.
Challenges and Future Directions
Prior to the fall of the Berlin wall, migrant groups were fairly easy to circumscribe. 
Such groups often became recognizable sedentary “ethnic” communities in their 
own right in the host country. In the aftermath of the political events that took 
place in 1989 and 1990, a new pattern of migration emerged that has changed the 
face of European urban conglomerates, many of them now showing a widely 
diverse influx among their populations originating from Eastern Europe, Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. The motives for and the forms of migration have 
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They include refugees, short-time migrants, transitory migrants, highly educated 
foreign employees, visiting foreign students, and workers commuting from one 
nation to another. The blending of “old” and “new” migration has brought about 
a new, what might be called postmodern, form of diversity, one for which the term 
“super-diversity” has been coined (Vertovec, 2006). This type of diversity is diver-
sity of a more complex kind in that the ethnic origin of people, their motives for 
migration, their “careers” as migrants (sedentary vs. short term and transitory), 
and their sociocultural and sociolinguistic biographies cannot be presupposed 
(see Maryns and Blommaert, 2006; Blommaert, 2010; Spotti, 2011b).
This new migratory wave is confronting the popular conceptions of “immi-
grants” with new challenges: the challenge of grasping who an immigrant actually 
is as well as the challenge of grasping their administrative position. As a result of 
all this, critical questions need to be raised with regard to the rationale and future 
of nation-states in Westernized Europe, about the dynamics of their dense 
and fast-moving urban spaces, about the embedded but as yet still omnipresent 
supremacy of the perspective of the majority within the institutions that regulate 
the entrance of migrants, and about the capacity of the bureaucracies of nation-
states to handle them. As a response, politicians—regardless of their political 
affiliations—are pushed to think about and enforce modernist measures that allow 
access to the nation-state territory, a process in which the national language 
and the knowledge of mainstream cultural norms and values play a critical role 
(see Extra, Spotti, & Van Avermaet, 2009; Mar-Molinero, Stevenson, & Hogan-
Brun, 2009). The Netherlands is no exception in this regard. Both the granting of 
access and the civic integration of new and old immigrants are processes deeply 
entrenched in a rigid set of modernist measures regulated by ideologies of fitting 
within a certain canon of language as well as cultural behavior. In other words, 
from the very beginning of a person’s immigration track, the Dutch state machin-
ery requires the would-be resident to comply with an ideology of linguistic 
homogenization sold as a prerequisite for active societal participation, starting 
from the principle that, if all noses point in the same direction (i.e., if we all speak 
Dutch and we are led by a common set of cultural norms and values), then main-
tenance of national order is guaranteed. There is very little point in rebelling 
against the modernist measures proposed by the nation-state machinery. This 
chapter aims to lay bare some of the paradoxes involved in granting citizenship 
to immigrants through language testing and testing cultural knowledge of the 
host country.
Testing “newcomers” and “oldcomers” on language and culture has become 
the localized reaction through which national realities respond to the suprana-
tional socioeconomic processes of globalization (see Blommaert, 2008, for evidence 
on how modernist ideologies play an important role in asylum-seeking pro-
cedures). In this process, CEFR levels play a key role. While these levels were 
initially intended as a tool to assess/measure multilingualism—and here we need 
to ask ourselves what kind of multilingualism is being measured and for the 
benefit of whom—they have now been turned into a powerful modernist tool to 
measure linguistic homogenization. They focus more on what newcomers and 
oldcomers lack in mainstream society than on what they might be able to contrib-
ute and add in terms of linguistic resources. Furthermore, through the testing 
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enterprise, the official language as well as the cultural norms and values of the 
majority have narrowed the desirable linguistic and cultural package to a civic 
doxa of (national) homogenization (Bourdieu, 1991). Although both newly arrived 
immigrants and long term residents bring along and might have already devel-
oped perfectly valuable linguistic and cultural resources by themselves, these 
resources do not symbolically qualify as valid skills—whether linguistic, cultural, 
or both—because they do not fit in the Herderian equation of nation, language, 
and territory. Not only does this imply a disqualification of the immigrant’s own 
resources, it also implies huge financial constraints, to be made even sharper from 
2014 onwards, which are imposed on both physical access to the country of resi-
dence and actual participation in the tests, not to mention the sanctions implicit 
in failing them.
SEE ALSO: Chapter 22, Language Testing for Immigration to Europe; Chapter 93, 
The Influence of Ethics in Language Assessment
References
Adviescommissie Inburgeringsnormen. (2004). Inburgering Getoetst: Advies over het Niveau 
van het Inburgeringsexamen in het Buitenland. The Hague, Netherlands: Ministerie voor 
Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie.
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. 
London, England: Verso.
Bauman, R., & Briggs, C. (2003). Voices of modernity. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Block, D. (2006). Multilingual identities in a global city: London stories. London, England: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Blommaert, J. (2008, April). Language, asylum, and the national order. Paper presented as a 
plenary lecture at the annual meeting of the American Association of Applied Linguis-
tics (AAAL), Washington, DC.
Blommaert, J. (2010). The sociolinguistics of globalization. Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and symbolic power. Cambridge, England: Polity.
Council of Europe (2001). Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, 
teaching, assessment. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press/Author.
De Heer, J. C. (2004). The concept of integration in converging Dutch minority and migra-
tion policies. In A. Böcker, B. de Hart, & I. Michalowski (Eds.), Migration and the regula-
tion of social integration (Special issue). IMIS-Beiträge, 24, 177–88.
Extra, G., Spotti, M., & Van Avermaet, P. (Eds.). (2009). Language testing, migration and citi-
zenship: Cross-national perspectives. London, England: Continuum.
Gedoogakkord. (2010). Gedoogakkord. Retrieved November 23, 2012 from http://nl.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Gedoogakkoord
Hoofdlijnenakkoord. (2003, May 16) Meedoen meer werk minder regels: Hoofdlijnenakkoord voor 
het kabinet CDA VVD D66. Retrieved November 22, 2012 from http://www.
parlement.com/9291000/d/regak03.pdf
IND (Immigratie en Naturalisatie Dienst). (2005). De Naturalisatietoets: Op Weg naar het 
Nederlanderschap. Rijswijk, Netherlands: Author.
Language Testing for Immigration and Citizenship in the Netherlands 13
Kurvers, J., & Stockmann, W. (2009). Alfabetisering nt2 in beeld: Leerlast en succesfactoren. 
Tilburg, Netherlands: University of Tilburg.
Mar-Molinero, C., Stevenson, P., & Hogan-Brun, G. (Eds.). (2009). Testing regimes: Critical 
perspectives on language, migration and citizenship in Europe. Amsterdam, Netherlands: 
John Benjamins.
Maryns, K., & Blommaert, J. (2006). Conducting dissonance: Codeswitching and differential 
access to context in the Belgian asylum process. In C. Mar-Molinero & P. Stevenson 
(Eds.), Language ideologies, policies and practices: Language and the future of Europe (pp. 
177–90). Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
McNamara, T., & Shohamy, E. (2008). Language tests and human rights. International Journal 
of Applied Linguistics, 18(1), 89–95.
Pluymen, M. (2004). Exclusion from social benefits as an instrument of migration policy in 
the Netherlands. In A. Böcker, B. de Hart, & I. Michalowski (Eds.), Migration and the 
regulation of social integration (Special issue). IMIS-Beiträge, 24, 75–85.
Regeerakkoord. (2010, September 30). Vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid: Concept Regeerakkoord 
VVD-CDA. Retrieved November 22, 2012 from http://www.parlement.com/9291000/
d/pdfs/regeer2010.pdf
RRIN (1996). Rijksregeling Inburgering Nieuwkomers. The Hague.
Spotti, M. (2011a). Ideologies of success for superdiverse citizens: The Dutch testing regime 
for integration and the online private sector. Diversities, 13(2), 39–52.
Spotti, M. (2011b). Modernist language ideologies, indexicalities and identities: Looking at 
the multilingual classroom through a post-Fishmanian lens. Applied Linguistics Review, 
2(2), 29–50.
Van den Tillart, H., Olde Monninkhof, M., van den Berg, S., & Warmerdam, J. (2000). Nieuwe 
etnische groepen in Nederland: Een onderzoek onder vluchtelingen en statushouders uit 
Afghanistan, Ethiopië en Eritrea, Iran, Somalië en Vietnam. Ubbergen, Netherlands: 
Tandem Felix.
Verdonk, M. C. F. (2004a April 23). Contourennota herziening van het inburgeringsstelsel. The 
Hague, Netherlands.
Verdonk, M. C. F. (2004b). Herziening van het inburgeringsstelsel (Report to the Dutch Parlia-
ment on December 7).
Verdonk, M. C. F. (2005). Brief aan de Tweede Kamer (TK 29700, no. 26 & 33).
Vertovec, S. (2006). The emergence of super-diversity in Britain (COMPAS WP-06-25). Oxford, 
England: Centre on Migration Policy and Society.
Vogelaar, E. (2007). Deltaplan inburgering: Vaste voet in Nederland. Rijswijk, Netherlands: 
Ministerie VROM/Wonen, Wijken en Integratie.
WIB (Wet Inburgering in het Buitenland). (2006). Staatsblad (2006-28). The Hague, Nether-
lands: SDU Uitgeverij.
WIN (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers). (1998). Staatsblad (1998-261). The Hague, Nether-
lands: SDU Uitgeverij.
WRR (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid). (1989). Allochtonenbeleid. The 
Hague, Netherlands: SDU Uitgeverij.
Suggested Readings
Jacquement, M. (2005). Transidiomatic practices: Language and power in the age of glo-
balization. Language and Communication, 25(3), 257–77.
Leung, C., & Lewkowicz, J. (2006). Expanding horizons and unresolved conundrums: 
Language testing and assessment. TESOL Quarterly, 40, 211–34.
14 Assessment Contexts
Peters, R., & Vellenga, S. (2007). Contested tolerance: Public discourse in the Netherlands 
on Muslim migrants. Soziale Velt Sonderband, 17(1), 221–40.
Thompson, J. (1984). Studies in the theory of ideology. Cambridge, England: Polity.
van Oers, R. (2008). From liberal to restrictive citizenship policies: The case of the Nether-
lands. Diversities, 10(1), 40–59.
Online Resource
Naar Nederland. (n.d.). Home page. Retrieved November 22, 2012 from http://
www.naarnederland.nl/bestellen
